An Event Analysis Study of the  Economic Implications of the FCC\u27s UNE Decision: Backdrop for Current Network Sharing Proposals by Eisenach, Jeffrey A. et al.
AN EVENT ANALYSIS STUDY OF THE
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FCC's





James C. Miller III
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 20, 2003, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") voted to approve new unbundled network element ("UNE")
rules modifying the terms under which incumbent telephone companies must
resell their network facilities to competitors.' The previous UNE rules were
widely criticized-and had been invalidated by the courts-for being too broad
1 Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Chairman and Managing Partner, Empiris LLC; Paul S. Lowen-
grub, PhD., Independent Consultant; and James C. Miller III, Senior Advisor, Husch
Blackwell Sanders, LLP. The authors wish to express their gratitude to Timothy Ebner and
Jean Schieman for their capable assistance with this study.
Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Adopts New Rules for Network Un-
bundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Phone Carriers 1 (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter
UNE Press Release]. The final order, which explains in detail the Commission's action, was
issued on August 21, 2003. In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Ad-
vanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,984, 4 (Feb. 20, 2003). [hereinafter Triennial
Review Remand Order]. In 1999 in response to a Supreme Court decision, the Commission
adopted a process to reevaluate section 251's unbundling obligations every three years,
known as the triennial review process. See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 1, 15 (Sept. 15, 1999). The Triennial
Review Remand Order was issued in response to court remand of the first such review. See
Triennial Review Remand Order, supra, 99 5, 28-34.
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and for requiring that facilities be made available at rates far below cost, even
in the absence of evidence that they were necessary for competitive entry.' The
previous UNE rules were criticized for two significant reasons. First, the rules
were criticized for allowing competitors to bundle together and resell a com-
plete platform of services-the so-called UNE-Platform ("UTNE-P")---without
ever making a significant investment in facilities.' Second, the rules were
criticized for applying the resale requirements to broadband facilities, even
though it was clear that phone companies had no market power for broadband
services.' The net effect of the UNE rules was to diminish incentives of both
incumbents and their competitors to invest in new facilities.'
Three of the FCC's five members at the time, Chairman Michael Powell and
Commissioners Kathleen Abernathy and Kevin Martin, had long been critical
of the existing rules.6 For many months prior to the modification of the UNE-P
rules, observers expected the majority to approve proposals to exempt broad-
band from the resale requirement and effectively abolish the UNE-P.7 In the
days leading up to the vote, however, news began to leak out that one of the
three, Commissioner Martin, was negotiating with state public utility commis-
sioners over their proposal to retain the UNE-P.8 In the end, Martin voted with
2 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-88, 392 (1999); U.S. Telecom
Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2002); WorldCom, Inc. v. U.S. Telecom Ass'n,
538 U.S. 1571, 1571-72 (2003), cert. denied; see also Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Com-
mons, and Associations: Why the Telecommunications Act of 1999 Misfired, 22 YALE J.
REG. 315, 336-37 (2005) (discussing UNE-P in the context of structural flaws in telecom-
munications regulation); Adam Thierer, UNE-P and the Future of Telecom "Competition,"
TECHKNOWLEDGE (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1, 2003, http://www.cato.org/
tech/tk/030201-tk.html ("No company will invest billions of dollars to become a facilities-
based broadband service provider if competitors who have not invested a penny of capital
nor taken an ounce of risk can come along and get a free ride on the investments and risks of
others." (quoting Michael Armstrong, former AT&T Chairman and CEO)).
3 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Gov-
ernment Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081, 1152 (1997); Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommuni-
cations Networks With and Without Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 492-94
(2006) [hereinafter Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks]; Thierer, supra note
2.
4 See Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks, supra note 3, at 492-94;
Thierer, supra note 2; HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEM-
BER 31, 2002 tbls. 1, 2 (2003).
5 See Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks, supra note 3, at 492-94.
6 Jonathan Krim, FCC Preparing to Overhaul Telecom, Media Rules, WASH. POST,
Jan. 3, 2003, at El.
7 Yochi J. Dreazen, Bell Companies Lose Customers to AT&T, MCI, WALL ST. J., Dec.
12, 2002, at B14 [hereinafter Dreazen, Bell Companies Lose Customers]; Krim, supra note
6.
8 Mark Wigfield, FCC Chief Faces Deregulation Setback, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003,
at A3.
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Abernathy and Powell to exempt broadband facilities from unbundling, but
joined with Commissioners Jonathan Adelstein and Michael Copps-over the
dissents of Abernathy and Powell-to give states the authority to retain the
UNE-P.9
The combined market capitalization of the incumbent telephone companies
declined by $15 billion on the day of the vote, ° a fact that leads to the conclu-
sion that the Commission's ruling was, on the whole, a disincentive to invest-
ment in and by those companies. This result should serve as a lesson for poli-
cymakers considering imposing UNE-P-like rules on current broadband pro-
viders. The lNE-P regime is a direct corollary to current debate about the ap-
propriate governmental response to possible discriminatory behavior by broad-
band network operators." Rules requiring broadband network operators to
open their networks to allow non-network operators to offer competing ser-
vices arguably would have a negative impact on network operators similar to
that of the UNE-P regime. 2 Thus, the impact of retaining UNE-P, even in light
of an otherwise deregulatory action, provides a useful backdrop on which to
examine potential Commission decisions mandating the resale of broadband
facilities to non-facilities based providers especially on an end-to-end basis.
While economists generally agree that changes in market capitalization can
be a valid measure of the economic impact of events such as the UNE decision,
they also recognize, as do investors, that stock price fluctuations may result
from many factors, including random variations and underlying market
trends. 3 To isolate the impact of a particular event, ceteris paribus, it is neces-
sary to apply statistical analysis to filter out such factors. The statistical tech-
nique used to do so is known as event analysis. 4
In this study, we apply the event analysis methodology to examine the im-
9 Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 1, at 16,978, 17,504, 17,512.
10 E.g., TELECOMMUNICATIONS STOCKS AND THE FCC's TRIENNIAL REVIEW, PHOENIX
CENTER, POLICY BULLETIN No. 2 at 1-2, 2 n.3 (2003) [hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS
STOCKS], available at http://www.phoenix-center.org/PolicyBulletin/PolicyBulletinNo2.pdf.
II J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer- Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation
on the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349, 413 (2006) (discussing the corollary in
terms of the necessity of defining or presuming a market structure).
12 See BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 60 (2007), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf (Opponents of network neutrality regu-
lation "maintain that imposing network neutrality regulation will impede investment in up-
grading Internet access and may actually hamper innovation."); see also LARRY F. DARBY,
AM. CONSUMER INST., CONSUMER WELFARE, CAPITAL FORMATION AND NETWORK NEUTRAL-
ITY: PAYING FOR NEXT GENERATION BROADBAND NETWORKS (2006), http://www.
theamericanconsumer.org/2006/06/06/consumer-welfare-capital-formation-and-net-
neutrality-paying-for-next-generation-broadband-networks.
13 See infra Appendix A.
14 See A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE, Mar. 1997, at 13, 14-15.
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pact of the FCC's UNE decision on the two telecommunication industry sec-
tors most directly affected by the FCC's decision: the Regional Bell Operating
Companies ("RBOCs") and the competitive local exchange carriers that rely
on the UNE platform ("UNE-P CLECs"). 5 We also examine the impact of the
decision on facilities-based CLECs and telecommunications equipment manu-
facturers. 6 We find that the FCC UNE decision did indeed have a significant
negative impact on RBOC market capitalization, reducing their going-forward
value by approximately $19 billion compared to what it would have been had
the FCC repealed the UNE-P rules. 7 The results of the study have important
implications in the current regulatory and policy debate regarding the appro-
priate intervention to prevent any potential discriminatory behavior by broad-
band service providers. Should the Commission adopt a prophylactic rule re-
quiring some level of network sharing between facilities-based providers and
non-facilities based competitors, this study shows that the immediate negative
impact could be significant.
Our model and empirical results are presented and discussed in Parts IV and
V, and in Appendix A. First, in Parts II and III, we place the FCC's decision in
context. Part II draws an analogy to the UNE-P regime and proposed non-
discrimination rules requiring network owners to resell broadband network
elements to non-facilities based providers. Part III describes the role of the
telecommunications sector in the U.S. economy before 2003, and explains why
the FCC's decision was important from the perspective of overall economic
performance. Part IV turns to the specifics of the UNE issue, and places in
context some of the events leading up to the decision. After presenting our
analysis and discussing its implications in Parts V, VI, and VII, we conclude
that the economic impact of retaining UNE-P should serve as a lesson for pol-
icy makers about the effects of imposing network sharing arrangements on
network operators.
II. THE UNE-P REGIME AND ITS RELATION TO PROPOSED NET
NEUTRALITY RULES
In an effort to increase competition in local telecommunications markets-a
primary goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act ("1996 Act")' 8-the FCC
promulgated regulations that required both the RBOCs and local telephone
15 For discussion of the firms included in the sample, see infra Appendix A.
16 See infra Part Il.
17 See infra Part V.
18 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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companies to lease their networks to competitive providers. 9 The UNE rules
were adopted to provide competitive telecommunications operators access to
network infrastructure that they could not afford to build out themselves." This
regime closely parallels the current debate regarding rules to prevent possible
discriminatory behavior by broadband service providers.
Some groups, primarily Internet application providers,2' advocate for rules
that would require broadband network owners to provide non-network owners
free, non-discriminatory access to their networks.2 These services would com-
pete with the network owners' services. 3
Some argue that broadband providers currently are discriminating or have
the capacity to discriminate against competing services by denying equal and
open access to their networks.24 Proponents of open access rules argue that
competition can be inhibited by this alleged discriminatory behavior, which
would result in higher consumer prices, less innovation, and possible restraints
on free speech and the dissemination of information. 25
19 Id., sec. 101(a), § 251(c)(2); 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000); see infra, Part IV.
20 See infra, Part IV.
21 See Open Internet Coalition, Who We Are, http://www.openinternetcoalition.com/
index.cfm?objectid=00 16502C-F I F6-6035-B 1264DD29499E9D0 (last visited Nov. 18,
2008). The Open Internet Coalition states that it "represents consumers, grassroots organiza-
tions, and businesses working in pursuit of a shared goal: keeping the Internet fast, open and
accessible to all Americans." Id. The group lists Amazon, eBay, Google, and their respec-
tive subsidiaries, Paypal, Skype, YouTube, among its members. Id.
22 See Open Internet Coalition, Why an Open Internet, http://www.
openinternetcoalition.com/index.cfm?objectid=0016BFAO-F 1 F6-6035-BC6DFC8AOE03CO
D7 (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
Simply, net neutrality guarantees that broadband networks cannot use their networks to
give preferential fast lane access to any content provider, nor can they slow down con-
tent or services that are unable to pay. The Open Internet Coalition seeks to ensure that
the transmission of internet traffic remains open, accessible and fast, and does not favor
one particular brand or type of content over another.
Id.
23 See id; Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J.
383, 387-90 (2007).
24 See Nicholas Economides, "Net Neutrality, " Non-Discrimination and Digital Distri-
bution of Content Through the Internet, 4 11S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOCIETY 209, 216
(2008) (discussing price discrimination by broadband network owners); Frischmann & van
Schewick, supra note 23, at 387-88 ("[Net neutrality advocates] contend that the threat of
discrimination will reduce unaffiliated application and content developers' incentives to
innovate; and that the resulting reduction in application-level innovation will be bad for
society." (citations omitted)).
25 See Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 23, at 387-88; Savethelntemet.com,
Statement of Principles, http://www.savetheinternet.com/=principles (last visited Nov. 18,
2008) ("Network neutrality is the Internet's First Amendment. Without it, the Internet is at
risk of losing the openness and accessibility that has revolutionized democratic participa-
tion, economic innovation and free speech.").
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In 2005, the FCC adopted its Policy Statement on open access, which laid
out four principles relating to broadband network openness, affordability, and
accessibility:
[ I ] To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and in-
terconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to access the lawful
Internet content of their choice. [2] To encourage broadband deployment and pre-
serve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consum-
ers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the
needs of law enforcement. [3] To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and
promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are en-
titled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network. [4] To en-
courage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and intercon-
nected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to competition among
network providers, application and service providers, and content providers.26
Proponents of open access view the Policy Statement as a positive, but inef-
fective step, and continue to push the Commission to take a stronger stance on
discriminatory behavior by broadband providers.27 They worry that the Policy
Statement may not be enforceable; 28 therefore they are seeking a formal rule
that would require open access for providers of competitive services and appli-
cations.29
Opponents to open access rules argue that broadband providers need the
26 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommu-
nications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appro-
priate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 (Sept. 23, 2005) (citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., In re Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet
Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not meet and Exception
for "Reasonable Network Management;" Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent
LEC Telecommunications Services; Computer II Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Oper-
ating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-
Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-
Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet over Cable Declara-
tory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Cable Facilities, Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press et al., at 7, 23 (Nov. 1,
2007), http://www.fcc.gov/broadbandnetwork management/fpet al nn declaratory_
ruling.pdf (encouraging the FCC to enforce the Policy Statement in relation to Comcast
limiting network access to peer-to-peer networks).
28 See Jerry Brito & Jerry Ellig, A Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality and Regu-
latory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 2-4 (2007) ("In short ... the Commission
cannot enforce the Policy Statement because it is not a legally binding legislative or inter-
pretative rule.").
29 See Savethelnterent.com, supra note 25 ("We urge Congress to take steps now to
preserve network neutrality, a guiding principle of the Internet, and to ensure that the Inter-
net remains open to innovation and progress.").
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ability to manage their networks to ensure high quality service to the end
user. ° Therefore, broadband providers should have the ability to exercise some
level of management that would favor or disfavor some services or applica-
tions that does not rise to the level of discriminatory behavior. Furthermore,
they argue that while the Commission has not yet adopted a formal rule, its
policy statement is an effective remedy for discriminatory behavior. For in-
stance, the Commission recently relied in part on the Policy Statement to pun-
ish discriminatory behavior by at least one broadband provider."
In August, 2008, the Commission adopted a Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, finding that Comcast Corp. ("Comcast") used "unreasonable network
management practices" 2 when it degraded the service of its customers utilizing
peer-to-peer file sharing program BitTorrent.33 As a result, the Commission
required Comcast to submit disclosures to ensure that it was practicing "proto-
col-agnostic network management technique[s]."34 If Comcast did not comply
within thirty days, the Commission reserved the right to impose injunctive re-
lief forbidding Comcast from practicing any network management tech-
niques.35 Comcast has appealed the decision. 6
The action taken by the Commission to remedy Comcast's behavior falls
short of structural rules imposing open access on all broadband network own-
ers. Required open access, either through a physical unbundling regime or a
type of structural separation of the broadband transmission component is
analogous to the former UNE-P regime. As the following economic event
30 See, e.g., Letter from Mike McCurry & Christopher Wolf, Co-Chairs, Hands off the
Internet, to Editor, New York Times (2008), available at http://handsoff.org/blog/letters/
letter-to-the-new-york-times/. Hands off the Internet is a coalition of broadband network
owners and equipment manufacturers. See Hands off the Internet, Member Organizations,
http://handsoff.org/blog/member-organizations (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
31 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Cor-
poration for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Rea-
sonable Network Management," Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 08-183, File No.
EB-08-IH-1518, WC Docket No. 07-52, 2, 41 (Aug. 1, 2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.
gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf [hereinafter Comcast Memorandum
Opinion and Order]. The Commission expounds on its authority across 16 paragraphs in the
Comcast Order. The Commission cites to the Policy Statement to help establish its broad
authority to "oversee[] and enforce[] 'national Internet policy' established by Congress and
espoused in 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000). Id. 13.
32 Id. 54.
33 Id. 4. ("BitTorrent is an open-source, peer-to-peer networking protocol that has
become increasingly popular among Internet users in recent years." (citation omitted)).
34 Id. 54.
35 Id. 55.
36 Petition for Review, Comcast Corp. v. FCC No. 08 (D.C. Cir. Filed Sept. 4, 2008);
see John Dunbar, Comcast Appeals FCC Web-Blocking Decision, MSNBC.coM (Sept. 4,
2008), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26546897/.
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analysis shows, such rules could have significant and immediate adverse ef-
fects on network owners' market capitalization. This in turn acts as a disincen-
tive to expand or maintain current infrastructure as well as to build next gen-
eration network infrastructures.
III. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, INVESTMENT AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
In the late 1990s, real Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") growth in the
United States averaged nearly 5% annually, and labor productivity grew at an
annual rate of 2.5%, nearly twice the rate of the previous two decades.37
Economists generally agree that improvements in information and communica-
tions technology ("ICT") associated with the rise of the Internet were responsi-
ble for a significant portion of these positive economic results, with investment
in the telecommunications sector playing an especially important role.38 As
shown in Table 1 infra, ICT sector investment-investment in information
processing equipment and software as measured by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis ("BEA")-grew by nearly 156%, from $182.7 billion in 1995 to
$467.6 billion in 2000.3" By the end of the decade, the ICT sector accounted for
nearly fifty cents of every dollar of private equipment investment in the United
States.4"
37 See JEFFREY EISENACH, THOMAS LENARD & STEPHEN McGONEGAL, THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY FACT BOOK 79, 84 (3d ed. 2001).
38 See, e.g., Dale W. Jorgenson, Information Technology and the U.S. Economy, 91
AMER. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2001); Alan Greenspan, Chairman Fed. Reserve, Technology Inno-
vation and Its Economic Impact, Remarks Before the National Technology Forum, St.
Louis, Missouri (Apr. 7, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2000/20000407.htm; see also Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, Information
Technology and Productivity: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?, 29 (Fed.
Reserve Bd. Working Paper, May 10, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2002/200229/200229pap.pdf.
39 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT
ACCOUNTS TABLE 5.5.6 REAL PRIVATE FIXED INVESTMENT IN EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE BY
TYPE, CHAINED DOLLARS (2008), available at http://bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Index.asp
(select "list of All NIPA Tables," follow link for "Table 5.3.6. Real Private Fixed Invest-
ment by Type, Chained Dollars (A) (Q)," and select dates).
40 Id. In 2000, total fixed, private investment in equipment and software was $926.2
billion of which $467.6 billion was information processing equipment and software. Id.
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Table 1. Private, Nonresidential Fixed Investment in Equipment and Software
($ Billions, 1995-2002)"'




Software 182.7 218.9 269.9 328.9 398.5 467.6 459.0 437.4
Industrial
Equipment 134.9 139.9 143.0 148.1 147.9 159.2 145.7 134.5
Transportation
Equipment 120.6 125.4 135.9 145.4 167.7 160.8 142.8 126.0
Other
Equipment 105.9 110.0 119.9 129.7 130.3 134.6 129.6 125.8
Total 544.1 594.2 668.7 752.1 844.4 922.2 877.1 823.7
Conversely, the meltdown in the ICT sector contributed significantly to the
economic slowdown between 2000 and 2002.42 In the same time period, the
telecommunications and computer sectors experienced more layoffs than any
other sector of the economy, and losses in ICT sector market capitalization
contributed disproportionately to the drop in equity values and associated de-
clines in net worth and retirement savings. 43 For instance, the telecommunica-
tions and computer sectors laid off more employees (946,000) between the
beginning of 2000 and the end of 2002 than the automotive, electronics, and
industrial goods sectors combined (862,000)."
Furthermore, while total private employment in the United States declined
by 1.7% between January 2001 and December 2002,"5 employment in the high-
tech sector of the economy fell by 9.8%, representing a net loss of 559,900
41 See id. (in chained 2000 dollars).
42 See JEFFREY A. EISENACH & THOMAS M. LENARD, TELECOM DEREGULATION AND THE
ECONOMY: THE IMPACT OF UNE-P ON JOBS, INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 6 (2003) [hereinafter
EISENACH & LENARD, IMPACT OF UNE-P], available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/
pop 10.3unepimpact.pdf.
43 See id. at 7; see also Rediff.com, Stocks in 2000: Winners and Losers, http://in.rediff.
com/money/2001/jan/05spec.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2008) (describing the "infotech
punt").
44 See EISENACH ET AL., THE DIGITAL ECONOMY FACT BOOK, supra note 37, at 7 (citing
data from Challenger, Gray and Christmas Inc.).
45 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT, HOURS, AND EARNINGS FROM THE
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS SURVEY (NATIONAL): COMPARISON OF ALL EMPLOYEES
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARCH 2007 BENCHMARK, ftp://ftp.bls.
gov/pub/suppl/empsit.compaes.txt (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (demonstrating the decline in
total private employment data between January 2001 and December 2002).
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jobs.' The NASDAQ composite index fell 42% between the beginning of 2001
and the end of 2002."7 However, the computer and telecommunications indices
fell even more sharply, by 47%48 and 75%,49 respectively. According to the
Federal Reserve Board, the overall net worth of American households declined
in 2000 for the first time since 1945,50 and continued falling in 2001 and
2002. " Between 2000 and 2003, the net worth of American households de-
clined by $1.53 trillion. 2 Contributing to this decrease in household net worth
were losses in the stock market valuation of the telecommunications sector of
nearly $2 trillion,53 with telecommunications equipment alone accounting for
$1.4 trillion of the total. 4 According to BEA, ICT sector investment declined
by over 6% between 2000 and 2002." In fact, investment in communications
equipment declined by 21% in 2002 alone. 6
Economists credit much of the rapid economic growth of the late 1990s to
technological progress in the ICT sector. 7 However, prior to repeal of the UNE
requirements for broadband providers, ICT sector experts agreed that further
progress depended on the rapid development of broadband communications
services. 8 In 2001, economists Robert Crandall and Charles Jackson estimated
46 Press Release, American Electronics Association, High-Tech Workforce Shrinks by
560,000 Jobs over Two Years (Mar. 19, 2003) (providing data that demonstrates a decline in
the U.S. high-tech employment industry between January of 2001 and December of 2002).
47 AIXIC, the NASDAQ Composite Index, decreased from 2291.86 on January 2, 2001
to 1335.51 on December 31, 2002. See Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (Search
"^IXIC" and follow "Historical Prices" hyperlink).
48 AIXK, the NASDAQ Computer Index, decreased from 1181.87 on January 2, 2001 to
622.6 on December 31, 2002. See Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (search
"IIXK" and follow "Historical Prices" hyperlink).
49 AIXUT, the NASDAQ Telecommunications Index, decreased from 429.08 on January
2, 2001 to 107.5 on December 31, 2002. See Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com
(search "AIXUT" and follow "Historical Prices" hyperlink).
50 Martin Crutsinger, Networth of US Households Decline, AP ONLINE, Mar. 13, 2001.
5' BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS Ac-
COUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, 1995-2004 at 97
(2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/annuals/a1995-2004.
pdf.
52 Id.
53 See NASDAQ Telecommunications Index, supra note 49; see also Letter from Mat-
thew J. Flanigan, President, Telecommunications Industry Ass'n, to Michael Powell, Chair-
man, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://www.tiaonline.org/
gov affairs/fccfilings/documents/02-126jpowellletter.pdf.
54 See EISENACH ET AL., THE DIGITAL ECONOMY FACT BOOK, supra note 37, at 6.
55 See U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 39 (noting $467.6 billion in investment at the end
of 2000 as compared to $437.4 billion at the end of 2002).
56 See id. (noting $114.7 billion in investment at the end of 2001 as compared to $90.5
billion at the end of 2002).
57 EISENACH & LENARD, IMPACT OF UNE-P, supra note 42, at 3.
58 In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Ex-
change Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommuni-
[Vol. 17
FCC UNE Economic Implications
the benefits of widespread broadband for the economy at over $500 billion. 9
As telecommunications stock values collapsed in the early 2000s, telecom-
munications investment experienced a sharp decline: telecom capital expendi-
tures declined by 18% in 2001.' As the FCC considered changes in its UNE
rules, the economic distress of the telecommunications sector contributed to
the sense of significance and urgency surrounding what many people believed
would be one of its most important decisions since passage of the 1996 Tele-
communications Act.
6'
IV. THE UNE RULES AND THE FCC'S FEBRUARY 20, 2003 DECISION
The FCC's UNE rules, first issued in August 1996,62 require ILECs, includ-
ing both the RBOCs and the then existing 1400 or so smaller local telephone
companies, to lease their networks to competitors at prices set by state public
utility commissions under a formula devised by the FCC.63 The rules have been
controversial from the outset and have twice been overturned by the courts.'
The UNE regime was a central element of the FCC's efforts to facilitate
cations Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Capability, Comments of High Tech Broadband Coalition, CC Docket No. 01-338, CC
Docket No. 96-98, CC Docket No. 98-147, at 5-17 (Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Comments of
the High-Tech Broadband Coalition] (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing Sys-
tem]; see Press Release, TechNet, A National Imperative: Universal Availability of Broad-
band by 2010 (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.technet.org/news/newsreleases/2002-01-
15.64.pdf (TechNet is an association of computer and other ICT companies).
59 ROBERT W. CRANDALL & CHARLES L. JACKSON, THE $500 BILLION OPPORTUNITY:
THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF WIDESPREAD DIFFUSION OF BROADBAND INTERNET
ACCESS, at iv (2001), available at http://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/Crandall_
Jackson_500_BillionOpportunityJuly_2001.pdf.
60 TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY ASs'N, INVESTMENT, CAPITAL SPENDING AND SER-
VICE QUALITY IN U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP 5, 7
(2002) (citing J. PARMELEE, TELECOM EQUIPMENT-WIRELINE UPDATE (2002)), available at
http://www.tiaonline.org/gov-affairs/fcc-filings/documents/Nov 13-2002_CapExQoS_
Final.pdf.
61 See EISENACH & LENARD, IMPACT OF UNE-P, supra note 42, at 8.
62 In re Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 12 (Aug. 1, 1996)
[hereinafter First Report and Order].
63 See id. 9 268, 625. States, however, had authority to exempt smaller companies. See
id. 938.
64 The rules were initially overturned by the Supreme Court. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd. 525 U.S. 366, 387-88, 392 (1999). After being rewritten on remand, In re Implementa-
tion of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third
Report and Order and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 9 1, 8
(Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter UNE Third Report and Order], the rules were again challenged




competition in the local telecommunications marketplace, a major goal of the
1996 Act.65 The intent of lawmakers in creating the UNE regime was to speed
entry and enhance competition in the local telephone market by allowing com-
petitors access to facilities that cannot economically be duplicated.6 6 The cen-
tral economic question raised by the policy is its impact on investment. If the
mandated price of access to existing facilities is set below the risk-adjusted
cost of investing in new ones along with an adequate return on investment,
then neither incumbents nor entrants have an incentive to build new facilities.67
UNE prices set below costs may also have the effect of encouraging excessive
entry by inefficient firms.66 When the resale requirement is applied to network
elements that economically can be duplicated by competitors, the economic
effects are especially perverse. The effect is to deter investment that is not only
economically efficient, but which would contribute to the development of sus-
tainable, facilities-based competition.69
The impact of the rules on investment was a major issue in the FCC's re-
view of the UNE regime, which the Commission voted to initiate in December
2001.7 The Commission voted specifically to "seek comment on whether [it]
should modify or limit incumbents' unbundling obligations going forward so
as to encourage incumbents and others to invest in new construction."'" More
specifically, the Commission considered that "requiring incumbents to unbun-
dle new or upgraded facilities may discourage them from investing in those
facilities in the first place. Moreover, the availability of incumbent facilities at
cost-based rates may discourage competitive carriers and others from investing
in or using alternatives to the incumbent's network.
7 2
The Commission's concern appears to have been driven by both legal and
economic issues. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission's earlier rules
on the grounds that the Commission failed to justify the rules as "rationally
related to the goals of the Act."73 Specifically, the Court pointed to the Com-
65 H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996); see First Report and Order, supra note 62, 27.
66 The 1996 Telecommunications Act directs the Commission to mandate access to
incumbent facilities "necessary" for new entrants to compete, or the absence of which would
"impair" their ability to do so. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2000).
67 EISENACH & LENARD, IMPACT OF UNE-P, supra note 42, at 9.
68 Sidak & Spulber, supra note 3, at 1152; see First Report and Order, supra note 62,
638.
69 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 3, at 1152.
70 In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Ex-
change Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Capability, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,781, 1 (Dec. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Triennial Review NPRM].
71 Id. 24.
72 Id. 23 (citation omitted).
73 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).
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mission's determination of which network elements would be subject to the
UNE resale requirements.74
Economic concerns were also at the forefront of the Commission's delibera-
tions. By 2001, a substantial body of economic research had been conducted
on the impact of the UNE rules on investment.75 For the most part, the eco-
nomic evidence suggested that the UNE regime had discouraged investment by
incumbents and CLECs alike.76
UNE prices, which the states initially set at levels approximately 25% below
levels they previously had determined were necessary to recover costs, were
further reduced over time-often as a condition of granting approval for the
RBOCs to offer long distance service." One study found that by 2001, UNE
rates were covering between 39% and 52% of revenue the RBOCs would have
received had the lines not been leased and between 49% and 66% of operating
costs." There was growing evidence that the markets for some TINE ele-
ments-most notably switches-had become competitive and that multiple
providers were deploying these elements.79 Furthermore, evidence suggested
that competition was uniquely robust in certain markets, such as in urban areas
and with business customers, although competition elsewhere, in rural areas
for example, still lagged."0 Finally, in the market for residential broadband ser-
vices, telephone companies served less than one-third of all broadband cus-
tomers, compared with over two-thirds served by cable companies.'
In this context, the FCC voted in December 2001 to seek comments on three
74 Id. at 387-89. The Commission responded by issuing the UNE Remand Order. First
Report and Order, supra note 62, 1, 8. At the time of the Triennial Review notice in De-
cember 2001, the UNE Remand Order was under appeal in the DC Circuit. U.S. Telecom
Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
75 See EISENACH & LENARD, IMPACT OF UNE-P, supra note 42, at 11, 18 (examining
multiple economic studies on the effects of the UNE rules on investment).
76 This assessment of the evidence is based upon our careful review of the literature on
these issues. Of course, researchers are not unanimous; a few studies come to different con-
clusions. For a review of different conclusions, see Eisenach & Lenard, IMPACT OF UNE-P,
supra note 42, at 11-16.
77 Id. at 10.
78 Id.
79 UNE Third Report and Order, supra note 64, 35.
80 See FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N, BROADBAND SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ANALYSIS OF AVAILABILITY AND DEMAND 20-22 (2002), available at
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/ publications/pdf/telecomm/tele-takeratestudyfinal.pdf
81 HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2002
tbls.3, 4 (2003) (reporting high-speed services based on data from December 2001). The
FCC found, based on mandatory reports from service providers, that there were approxi-
mately 4.9 million business and residential broadband customers (advanced service and
high-speed) who received ADSL or fiber optics as of December 2001. Id. The FCC also
found that there were approximately 11.4 million business and residential broadband cus-
tomers (advanced service and high-speed) who received service via coaxial cable. Id. As of
December 2001, approximately 16.8 million consumers subscribed to broadband. Id.
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specific substantive reforms. First, the Commission asked whether it should
examine markets at a more "granular" level in determining whether there was
sufficient market power to justify continued application of the UNE regime. 2
Second, the Commission asked whether the list of network elements to which
the UNE regime should be applied should be narrowed, including specifically
whether switching services should be removed." Finally, the Commission
sought comment on whether broadband services offered by incumbent tele-
phone companies should be reclassified as "information services," thereby re-
moving them from the UNE regime. 4 In addition, the Commission sought
comment on the role state public utility commissions should play in imple-
menting the UNE regime-an issue that turned out to be central to the final
outcome. 5
As discussed further in Part V infra, many believed at the time the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking was issued, and throughout most of the fourteen-month
period it was under consideration, that three of the commissioners, Chairman
Powell and Commissioners Abernathy and Martin, were broadly in agreement
with the deregulatory agenda it implied. 6 The other two, Michael Copps and
Jonathan Adelstein, were assumed to be skeptical or opposed. 7 Thus, observ-
ers expected that a 3-2 FCC majority would issue new UNE rules that would
lighten the regulatory burden on the RBOCs.
First, the Commission was expected to adopt rules to exempt new invest-
ments in broadband facilities from resale obligations and pare back the list of
UNE elements subject to unbundling. In particular, switching would be re-
moved from the list, thus effectively eliminating the UNE-Platform.88 Next, the
Commission was expected to establish a formula or set of benchmarks upon
which to judge the competitiveness of markets for other UNE elements. As
these markets became more competitive, the Commission would create a proc-
ess by which the elements would be removed from the list.9" Finally, the rules
were expected to allow states to retain an advisory role and a role in implemen-




86 Krim, supra note 6.
87 Id.
88 See Yochi J. Dreazen & Shawn Young, FCC Plans to Erase a Key Rule Aiding Local
Phone Competition, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A l [hereinafter Dreazen & Young, Erase a
Key Rule]. The removal of switching was seen as especially important because of the key
role it plays in the UNE-Platform, allowing competitors to operate as pure resellers, without
making any substantial investment in their own facilities. Removing switching from the list
would effectively end UNE-P. Id.
89 Triennial Review NPRM, supra note 70, 67.
90 Id.
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tation and enforcement, but not authority to decide which elements would be
subject to the UNE resale requirements."
On February 20, 2003, after a fourteen-month rulemaking that generated
thousands of comments, the Commission voted as expected to exempt broad-
band from the resale requirements.9 2 To the surprise of many observers, how-
ever, the Commission did not exclude switches from the list of UNEs, nor did
it limit the role of states. 93 Instead, the Commission's decision increased the
authority of states to determine which elements, including switches, would be
subject to resale. 94 Since most state commissions appeared to favor retaining
the UNE requirement (and hence the UNE-P), the decision was seen widely as
a defeat for the RBOCs and for the deregulatory agenda of Chairman Powell."
V. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FCC'S UNE DECISION: AN
EVENT ANALYSIS STUDY
Our main purpose in this study is to measure the impact of the FCC's UNE
decision on the going-forward value of companies in the telecommunications
sector. Due to the similarities between the UNE-P regime and currently de-
bated broadband network open access and potential resale arrangements, the
result of the event study analysis is relevant to the debate. We measure the im-
pact of the FCC's UNE decision by using a widely-accepted methodology in
economics known as an event analysis.96 Simply put, an event study utilizes
movements in stock prices on the date or dates when an event becomes known
to investors as a measure of the impact of the event on the firm's value97 :
Using financial market data, an event study measures the impact of a specific event on
the value of a firm. The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact that, given ra-
tionality in the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in
security prices. Thus a measure of the event's economic impact can be constructed us-
ing security prices observed over a relatively short time period. In contrast, direct Vro-
ductivity related measures may require many months or even years of observation. 8
An event study begins by identifying dates when market participants became
aware of key events. Here the relevant dates are when the market became
aware of the parameters of the FCC's decision and, in particular, when the
91 Id. 78-79.
92 Stephen Labaton, Local Phone Rules to Stay in Place, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at
Al.
93 Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 1, 9 170-96, 419; see also Labaton,
supra note 92.
94 Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 1, 186-96.
95 See Labaton, supra note 92 (describing the decision as a "stinging defeat").
96 See MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, supra note 14, at 13-14, 38
(discussing the long history and continuing usefulness of event studies).




market became aware of the ways in which the decision would deviate from
prior market expectations.
To evaluate market expectations throughout the period, we canvassed sev-
eral sources of information, including LexisNexis,99 the Bureau of National
Affairs' Daily Report for Executives," and Telecommunications Reports.'°
From these sources, we identified news articles that reflected market expecta-
tions prior to the decision and news articles that most likely informed investors
of the nature of the final decision.
News stories published from December 2001-when the FCC initiated the
UNE rulemaking-through early January 2003 reflected the widely held ex-
pectation that the Commission would vote in favor of deregulation on both the
broadband and UNE issues."2 In December 2002 and January 2003, as the date
of the decision approached, these expectations formed more clearly. For exam-
ple on December 12, 2002, the Wall Street Journal reported that "Chairman
Michael Powell seems poised to alter the rules in coming months by removing
certain pieces of network equipment from the bundle that the Bells are required
to lease .... ."o3 While some reports during this period suggested that Commis-
sioner Kevin Martin might favor giving some authority over UNE regulation to
the states,' °4 Investors Business Daily reported on December 19, 2002 that
"[w]hile [Commissioner Kevin] Martin might not agree with Powell on some
issues, that doesn't mean he'll break ranks with the FCC's Republican majority
on a deregulatory agenda . . . .""' These expectations persisted into January.
On January 3, Washington Post reporter Jonathan Krim wrote that "analysts
are increasingly convinced that, for the most part, the deregulatory agenda of
Chairman Michael K. Powell will prevail ... 106 On January 6, 2003, the Wall
99 LexisNexis, About LexisNexis, http://global.lexisnexis.com/about.aspx (last visited
Oct. 22, 2008) ("We provide customers access to 5 billion searchable documents from more
than 32,00 legal, news and business sources.").
100 BNA, Product Information, Daily Report for Executives, http://www.bna.com/
products/corplaw/der.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2008) ("This well-organized, up-to-the-
minute, comprehensive report covers a broad spectrum of issues, providing all the objective
news you need to make sound business, lobbying, and legal decisions.").
101 Wolters Kluwer, Telecommunications Reports, About Us, http://www.tr.com/abouttr.
asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2008) ("Through newsletters, news wires, online services, and spe-
cial reports, Telecommunications Reports International (TR) is the leading purveyor of in-
telligence on domestic and international telecom business and policy strategies, local ex-
change competition, [and] service resale .... ).
102 See, e.g., Dreazen, Bell Companies Lose Customers, supra note 7 (noting industry
experts belief that the UNE rules would be repealed).
103 Id.
104 See Labaton, supra note 92.
105 Reinhardt Krause, FCC Commissioner Martin Gets Spotlight Looks Like Swing Vote:
The Government Agency Soon Will Take Key Votes Shaping the Phone Industry, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, Dec. 19, 2002, at A6 (quoting Scott Cleland of the Precursor Group).
106 Krim, supra note 6.
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Street Journal agreed, reporting "[f]ederal regulators are preparing to stop
making local phone companies rent their networks to rivals at cheap
rates .... '07
Furthermore, expectations of a deregulatory decision may have risen on
January 29, 2003 when Chairman Powell told a group of reporters that the vote
on the decision would take place a week ahead of the court-imposed February
20 deadline."°8 As the BNA's Daily Report for Executives reported on January
30, "Chairman Michael Powell told reporters ... that he expects new rules on
the Bell companies' unbundled network elements to be ready by the Commis-
sion's next scheduled meeting on [February] 13 .... Most observers expect the
new rules to give the Bell companies relief from the unbundled network ele-
ment platform (UNE-P). '"' By calling the vote early, Powell seemed to be
signaling that he had the votes for his proposal, a development that could well
have had a significant impact on market expectations.
When did these expectations change? That is, when did the market come to
understand that Powell's agenda would be defeated by a more regulatory alter-
native? A review of the stories suggests there were two "windows" during
which news of Chairman Powell's defeat likely reached investors."' On Febru-
ary 10, 2003, the Commission announced that the vote would not be held on
February 13 after all, but would instead be delayed until February 20."' USA
Today was first to report the story, printing on February 10 that "[a]n 1 th-
hour deal struck late last week by a majority of the five Federal Communica-
tions Commission members would derail the plans of Republican Chairman
Michael Powell to deregulate the regional Bell companies.""' 2 Then, on Febru-
ary 11, 2003, Telecommunications Reports wrote that "[m]any Wall Street ana-
lysts and money managers had been betting that the FCC's imminent ruling on
unbundled network elements (UNEs) and other competition rules would be
'Bell friendly.' But some financial odds makers are rethinking that position
now that the [FCC] has delayed its decision.""' 3 Thus, we conclude that the
announcement of a delay in the vote may have significantly impacted market
expectations.
While the delay was an important signal, negotiations between Chairman
107 Dreazen & Young, Erase a Key Rule, supra note 88.
108 Cheryl Bolen, Communications: New UNE Rules to Be Ready by Next Meeting, Pow-
ell Says, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Jan. 30, 2003, at Al.
109 Id.
110 See MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, supra note 14, at 15.
111 FCC Delays Decision on Local Phone Rules, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2003, at 1 B.
112 Paul Davidson, FCC Rule Change Could Boost DSL Prices, USA TODAY, Feb. 10,
2003, at lB [hereinafter Davidson, FCC Rule Change].
"13 FCC Delay Prompts Some on Wall Street to Change About Bell Company Prospects,
TELECOMM. REP. DAILY, Feb. 11, 2003 [hereinafter FCC Delay].
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Powell and the other commissioners continued through the ensuing week, and
the outcome remained in doubt."4 Thus, for example, on February 16, 2003,
the Denver Post wrote that the FCC "is expected Thursday to relax rules that
force [the Bell companies] to help their rivals break into local markets."" 5
By Wednesday, February 19, 2003, however, both USA Today and the Los
Angeles Times were reporting that the negotiations had broken down and that
Powell would indeed be defeated." 6 USA Today reported that "[d]espite a
flurry of talks," Powell had "failed to sway a majority of commissioners."" 7
The Los Angeles Times's headline was more blunt: "Powell Gives Up on Rule
Revamp.""'
Based on this chronology, we identified three event dates. Event dates are
the dates when the relevant news about the rulemaking reached the market."9
In keeping with standard practice,'20 we then identified three event windows,
defined as the three-day period encompassing the day before the event, the day
of the event and the day subsequent to the event.'2 ' Our event windows were:
January 29-31: The point at which market expectations of a deregulatory out-
come peaked was on the date when Chairman Powell announced his inten-
tion to hold the vote on February 13, 2003. The announcement came in a
meeting with reporters on January 29, 2003 and reached the market on Janu-
ary 30, 2003.22
February 10-12: Chairman Powell first demonstrated difficulty mustering a
majority when the FCC announced on February 10, 2003 that the vote
would be delayed.'23 This news reached the market on February 11, 2003.24
114 See id.
"15 Anne C. Mulkern, Phone Companies Await New Rules, DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2003,
at K1.
116 Paul Davidson, FCC's Powell Likely to Fail in Attempt to Deregulate Bells, USA
TODAY, Feb. 19, 2003, at 2B [hereinafter Davidson, Powell Likely to Fail]; James S. Gra-
nelli & Jube Shiver Jr., Powell Gives Up on Rule Revamp, L.A. TIMES, Feb 19, 2003, at Cl.
17 Davidson, Powell Likely to Fail, supra note 116.
118 Granelli & Shiver, supra note 116.
119 See MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, supra note 14, at 14-15, 35
(discussing event periods and appropriate sample interval to analyze an event).
120 Id. at 14-15.
121 The purpose of using multi-day event windows is to capture the possibility that news
of the event may "leak" and reach the market prior to the actual publication date of the arti-
cle itself, or that news may not reach all investors simultaneously, so that the full market
effect may not be felt until a day after the event itself. See id. at 35; see also discussion infra
Appendix A (describing event studies in finance).
122 See Bolen, supra note 108 (noting in a January 30, 2003 publication that the an-
nouncement occurred January 29, 2003).
123 Seeking Majority on "Triennial Review, " Powell Woos Adelstein with UNE-P Pro-
posal, TELECOMM. REP. DAILY, Feb. 11, 2003.
124 See Christopher Stem, FCC Vote on Phone Competition Delayed, WASH. POST, Feb.
H1,2003, at E 1.
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February 18-20: While the FCC's vote took place on February 20, 2003, news
of the final outcome was widely reported on February 19, 2003.125 We chose
February 19, 2003 as our event date, but included February 20, 2003 within
the event window.
Next, the companies likely to be impacted by the decision were identified. In
our case, two groups of companies were affected directly by the FCC's deci-
sion. The first group consists of the four RBOCs' 26 We theorize that by forcing
below-cost resale of their lines, the UNE rules deprived these companies of
income and, on a going forward basis, of the cash flow and access to capital
needed to invest in new facilities. Thus, we expected that news of the FCC's
intention to repeal the rules-the first event in our study-should have in-
creased their market valuations, other things equal, while news of a decision to
leave the rules in place-events two and three-should have decreased their
market valuations.
The second group of companies we examined consists of three competitive
local exchange carriers whose business models relied heavily on resale (i.e.,
the UNE-P). 7 With respect to these companies, we theorized that they bene-
fited from the arbitrage opportunity inherent in the UNE regime-that is, the
opportunity to lease lines from the RBOCs at state-mandated wholesale prices
while selling at much-higher, generally unregulated retail prices. Thus, we ex-
pected information indicating the FCC was likely to repeal the UNE rules-the
first event window-would reduce these firms' valuations, other things equal,
while news of a decision to leave the rules in place-event windows two and
three-should have increased their market valuations.
We tested these hypotheses using multiple regression analysis, as described
in detail in Appendix A. Each regression incorporated the Standard & Poor's
("S&P") 500 market index, intended to screen out trends affecting the broader
125 See, e.g., Granelli & Shiver, supra note 116 ("[FCC] Chairman Michael K. Powell
has abandoned his push to deregulate the telephone industry quickly as the agency prepares
to revise key rules .... "); Davidson, Powell Likely to Fail, supra note 116 ("[FCC] Chair-
man Michael Powell has failed to sway a majority of commissioners who oppose his plan to
deregulate the regional Bells .... ").
126 The four RBOCs at the time of the Triennial Review Remand Order were BellSouth
Corp., Qwest Communications Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communica-
tions Inc. Mulkem, supra note 115. The three remaining RBOCs are AT&T Corp., Qwest
Communications International Inc., and Verizon Communications, Inc. In re AT&T Inc. and
BellSouth Corporation Application Pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications Act of
1934 and Section 63.04 of the Commission's Rules for Consent to the Transfer of Control of
BellSouth Corporation to AT&T Inc., Comments of the National Association of State Utility
Consumer Advocates, WC Docket No. 06-74, at 3 (June 5, 2006) (accessible via FCC Elec-
tronic Comment Filing System).
127 See LARRY F. DARBY, JEFFREY A. EISENACH & JOSEPH S. KRAEMER, THE CLEC Ex-




market, plus dummy variables that were set equal to one of the dates included
in the event windows, and equal to zero on all other dates. For each group of
companies, we estimated the abnormal return ("AR") for each date individu-
ally, and calculated a cumulative abnormal return ("CAR") for the three days
that comprise each event window. The ARs and CARs, which represent the
estimated impact of the event on the going-forward value of the companies in
each sample, are expressed in both percentage terms (i.e., as a percentage of
the total market capitalization of the firms in the sample) and in absolute (dol-
lar) terms. In addition, we performed tests of statistical significance that al-
lowed us to determine the probability that the estimated ARs and CARs were
truly related to the events at issue, and not generated by random movements in
stock prices. The results of our analysis are reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2. Daily Abnormal Returns
EVENT ONE EVENT TWO EVENT THREE
(Vote Announced) (Vote Delayed) (Outcome Announced)
Sector 1/29 1/30 1/31 2/10 2/11 2/12 2/18 2/19 2/20
1.19% 1.15% 0.04% -2.00% -1.04% -1.65% -0.93% -3.68% -7.73%RBOCS (0.39) (0.37) (0.01) (0.65) (0.34) (0.54) (0.30) (1.20) (2.52*)
UNE-P 0.42% -1.20% 3.41% 2.05% -1.54% -0.28% 3.55% 14.48% 14.68%
CLECs (0.09) (0.26) (0.75) (0.45) (0.34) (0.06) (0.78) (3.20*) (3.24*)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 99%
confidence level.
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Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
EVENT ONE EVENT TWO EVENT THREE
(Vote Announced) (Vote Delayed) (Outcome Announced)
Change Change Change
in Market in Market in Market
Sector CAR Value CAR Value CAR Value
2.40% -4.62% -11.95%
RBOCS $7,329 -$13,164 -$19,182
(0.20) (0.80) (5.93*)
UNE-P 2.60% 0.20% 35.95%$437 $317 $361
Carriers (0.11) (0.00) (13.77*)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are F-statistics. Asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 99%
confidence level. Changes in market values are in millions of dollars.
As indicated in the tables, the first two events we examined, Chairman Pow-
ell's announcement of the date for the vote and the subsequent announcement
that the vote would be delayed, did not produce a statistically significant im-
pact on the market valuations of either set of companies. Measures of statistical
significance for estimates of both the daily ARs (t-statistics) and the event-
window CARs (F-statistics) are far below the levels that would allow us to
reject the null hypothesis of no effect.Y1
8
However, results for the third event window, representing the release of the
FCC's final decision, are strongly significant. The direction of the indicated
effect is consistent with the predictions of our theory. Daily ARs for the
RBOCs were negative on all three days of the window and were statistically
significant on February 20, 2003 at a 98% confidence level; daily ARs for the
UNE-P CLECs were positive on all three days and statistically significant on
both February 19 and February 20, 2003 at a 99% confidence level. The CARs
for the three-day window, viewed as a whole, were statistically significant at a
98% level for the RBOCs and a 99% level for the UNE-P CLECs.
As shown in the far-right column of Table 3, the CARs for both groups were
of significant magnitude. The market value of the four RBOCs decreased
nearly 12%, or more than $19 billion, from what it would have been had the
128 A null hypothesis "implies that there is no difference between the true value of a
population parameter and that which is being hypothesized." JAN KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF
ECONOMETRICS 1 1 (2d ed., 1986) A null hypothesis is considered true, unless it is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the hypothesis is not true. Id. at 112. Thus, by demonstrating
an effect, the null hypothesis of no effect may be rejected.
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FCC acted in accordance with prior market expectations. As an additional re-
sult, the market value of UNE-P CLECs increased by a substantially larger
percentage: nearly 36%. Because their market capitalizations are much smaller,
however, the absolute gain was a relatively small $361 million. The combined
net loss for the two sectors was approximately $18.9 billion.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Our results demonstrate the FCC's decision substantially reduced the
RBOCs' market value. As discussed infra, the implications of this result bear
on any future mandatory broadband resale rules adopted by the Commission.
Before exploring the broader ramifications of the FCC's action, however, a
comparison of our results with those of a study released in 2003 by the Phoe-
nix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Policy Studies ("Phoenix Center")
is useful. 29 Like our study, the Phoenix Center study used an event analysis to
isolate the impact of the FCC's decision on the market value of RBOCs and
UNE-P CLECs. 3 However, it reached a remarkably different result, conclud-
ing that despite the fact that the capitalized value of the RBOCs actually de-
clined by $15 billion the day of the vote-"the data suggests that BOC market
capitalization may have actually increased by $5.8 billion as a consequence of
the Triennial Review.
''" 3'
How is this possible? Like our study, the Phoenix Center study postulated
that news relevant to the FCC's ultimate decision may have reached the market
during more than one event window. 32 Specifically, their study identified two
event windows: first, January 6, 2003 when the Wall Street Journal published
a story'33 reporting the then-common wisdom that the FCC was likely to scale
back substantially the UNE regime; and second, February 20, 2003, the date of
the decision. 34 The study found that RBOC stocks gained value on the first
date and lost it on the second, but that the January 6, 2003 gains were larger
(by $5.8 billion) than the February 20, 2003 losses. "5 Arguing that "judgments
regarding the impact of the FCC's decision . . .must account for both
events,' 36 the Phoenix Center concluded that "the net impact of the two critical
events in the final stages of the Triennial Review process reveal that Bell mar-
129 See TELECOMMUNICATIONS STOCKS, supra note 10, at 1.
130 Id. at 4-6.
131 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
132 Id. at 6-7.
133 See Dreazen & Young, Erase a Key Rule, supra note 88.
134 TELECOMMUNICATIONS STOCKS, supra note 10, at 5.
135 Id. at 1, 5.
136 Id. at 5.
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ket cap increased by $5.8 billion."'37
The main problem with the Phoenix Center study lies in its choices of event
dates, each of which represents a significant error. The first event day, January
6, 2003, was chosen on the basis of what the Phoenix Center referred to as a
seminal event-the January 6, 2003 Wall Street Journal article.'38 The choice
was inapt for two reasons: the article reported no new news; 139 and other events
on that day-namely the announcement of President Bush's plan to eliminate
taxation of corporate dividends' 4 0-had a significant effect on RBOC stock
prices.
The expectation that the FCC would follow Chairman Powell's lead on the
Triennial Review Remand Order did not suddenly emerge in the marketplace
on January 6, 2003. To the contrary, most stories written about the rulemaking
during 2002 reflected the same set of expectations as those contained in the
January 6, 2003 Wall Street Journal article. 4' As noted above, the Wall Street
Journal itself carried very much the same news a month earlier, when it re-
ported that "Chairman Michael Powell seems poised to alter the [UNE] rules in
coming months by removing certain pieces of network equipment from the
bundle that the Bells are required to lease, people familiar with the matter
say."' 42 Indeed, later in the day on January 6, TR Daily, an authoritative indus-
try newsletter, ran a story in which an industry insider described the Wall
Street Journal's report as "nothing new."'43
The real news in early February 2003 was not about the Commission's rule-
making, but rather about President Bush's proposal to eliminate taxation of
corporate dividends.'" While the President formally announced the plan in a
speech on February 7, 2003, the details of the plan were reported prominently
137 Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
138 Id. at 4-5.
139 Compare Dreazen & Young, Erase a Key Rule, supra note 88 (reporting in January
2003 that the FCC was poised to repeal the UNE rules), with Dreazen, Bell Companies Lose
Customers, supra note 7 (reporting in December 2002 that the FCC likely would repeal the
UNE rules) and Krim, supra note 6 (reporting the same).
140 Associated Press, Shares Rise on Expectations About Bush's Tax-Cut Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at C9 [hereinafter Shares Rise on Expectations].
141 Compare Dreazen & Young, Erase a Key Rule, supra note 88, with Yochi J. Dreazen,
Appeals Court Sides with Bells in Dispute over Network Sharing, WALL ST. J., May 28,
2002, at B4; Dreazen, Bell Companies Lose Customers, supra note 7; and Rienhardt Krause,
FCC Commissioner Martin Gets Spotlight; Looks Like Swing Vote, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Dec. 19, 2002, at A6.
142 See Dreazen, Bell Companies Lose Customers, supra note 7.
W43 UNE-P Order Remains a Work in Progress with Commissioners Still in Dark, TELE-
COMM. REP. DAILY, Jan. 6, 2003.
144 See, e.g., Shares Rise on Expectations, supra note 140 (discussing the positive effects
of the expectation of the Bush tax cuts on the market).
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in the Wall Street Journal earlier on January 3, 2003 '4 (the first date in the
Phoenix Center event window) and covered heavily by the financial media on
January 6, 2003.46 Not surprisingly, coverage of the announcement sparked a
major stock market rally, especially among companies that pay high dividends,
including three of the four RBOCs."'7 As the New York Times reported in its
market wrap-up on January 7, 2003, "[a]nticipation of a tax cut yesterday reig-
nited the New Year's rally on Wall Street, sending shares sharply higher ....
Stocks that pay dividends, particularly big-name blue chips, were among yes-
terday's winners."'48
As shown in Table 4, RBOC stock prices increased slightly more than
stocks with comparable dividend yields during the January 3-7 window, and
we cannot conclusively prove that the Wall Street Journal's FCC story had no
effect. 49 What this demonstrates, however, is that the January 6 window is
heavily polluted by the President Bush's tax cut announcement and that much,
if not all, of the RBOC stock price movements that took place during that pe-
riod had nothing to do with the FCC's Triennial Review.
145 John D. McKinnon & Bob Davis, Bush Tries to Defuse Criticisms of Tax Cuts, WALL
ST. J., Jan, 3, 2003, at A3.
146 See, e.g., Bob Davis, Greg Hitt & John D. McKinnon, Bush to Propose Broad Tax
Cuts in a $600 Billion "Jobs" Package, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A I; Jim McTague,
Bush's Big Week: Decisions Due on Taxes, Iraq, BARRON'S, Jan. 6, 2003, at 24.
147 Shares Rise on Expectations, supra note 140.
148 Id.
149 However, analysis at the time suggested that telecommunications stocks would rise
more than those of other companies with similar dividend yields under the proposed divi-
dend tax cuts. The impact of eliminating the tax on dividends is a function of several factors,
which vary across sectors. Based on a sophisticated analysis, one study concluded that tele-
communications stocks would benefit the most of any major sector, with stock prices rising
by an average of 33.4%, compared with 23.3% for the next biggest winner, the materials
sector. See John Rutledge, Rutledge Capital, How the Dividend Tax Cut Will Work, (Jan. 4,
2003), http://www.rutledgecapital.com/Articles/20030104how the dividend-taxcutwork.
htm.
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Table 4. Stock Price Movements for High Dividend Stocks, Selected Indices
(January 3-7, 2003)
Current
Dividend Average Change in Stock Price
Sector Yield Jan. 3-7 January 6
RBOC4 3.33 7.86% 8.76%
Electric Utility 4.63 2.01% 5.07%
Automobile Manufacturers # #  5.62 2.38% 2.95%
S&P 500 Index - 1.53% 2.25%
Dow Jones Industrial Index 1.55% 2.00%
NASDAQ Composite Index 3.56% 2.47%
Notes: #BellSouth, Qwest, SBC, Verizon. ##Dominion Resources, DTE En-
ergy, First Energy, Florida Power & Light, PPL, Southern Company.
#Ford, General Motors, Daimler-Chrysler.
The Phoenix Center's choice for its second event window was also flawed,
because the window both begins (on February 19, 2003) and ends (on February
21, 2003) a day late. As noted above, the result of the FCC rulemaking was
widely reported in the media the morning of February 19, 2003, suggesting
that the news was available to at least some insiders a day earlier, on February
18, 2003. By the same token, the FCC's vote took place the morning of Febru-
ary 20, 2003 and was widely and immediately reported;' there is no reason to
believe that the effects of the news were still rippling through the markets on
February 21, 2003. By omitting February 18, 2003 and including February 21,
a date on which three of the four RBOC stocks actually went up,'' the Phoenix
Center study likely missed at least part of the effect of the FCC's actual deci-
sion. The Phoenix Center study also could have captured a "bounce back" ef-
fect on February 21, 2003 that partially offset the downward stock price move-
ment of the previous two days.
Through its incorrect choice of event windows, the Phoenix Center study
produced a result that missed the mark by as much as $25 billion-the $19.2
billion the RBOCs actually lost, plus the $5.8 billion the Phoenix study mis-
150 See, e.g., Wigfield, supra note 8 (announcing even before the vote occurred, "[FCC]
Chairman Michael Powell has apparently fallen short in his drive to fuirther deregulate the
telephone industry .... ").
'5' On February 21, BellSouth closed up $0.90, Qwest closed up $0.03, and Verizon
closed up $0.88, while SBC closed down $0.57. New York Stock Exchange Composite
Transactions. WALL ST. J.. Feb. 24. 2003, at C2.
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takenly concluded the RBOCs gained.'52 RBOC stocks fell sharply as a result
of FCC's decision; they certainly did not rise.
With this conclusion firmly established, we turn finally to discuss the impli-
cations of future Commission decisions imposing UNE-P type rules on broad-
band network owners.
VII. PARALLELS BETWEEN THE UNE-P REGIME AND PROPOSALS
TO FORCE NETWORK SHARING BY BROADBAND NETWORK
OPERATORS
The results of this study generally show that the market had an immediate
and negative initial response to the Triennial Review and Remand Order. The
FCC's UNE decision was expected to reduce substantially investment in the
telecommunications sector relative to what it would have been had the UNE
rules been substantially reformed. Two main consequences of the network
sharing rules generally are responsible for this result: (1) weakened incentives
to invest in facilities still covered by the rules; and (2) reduced cash flow from
operations available to fund investments. Because the D.C. Circuit remanded
the UNE-P Order, "3 and the Commission ultimately repealed the UNE-P re-
gime, "'54 the possible negative consequences were largely mitigated. Nonethe-
less, the immediate market effect of simply leaving the UNE-P regime in place
in the Triennial Review Remand Order is a strong lesson on investors' expecta-
tions that such rules limit investment and growth in the near and long terms.'
One approach to estimating the immediate short-term impact of the decision
on capital expenditures subsequent to the Triennial Review Remand Order is to
examine the proportion of RBOC cash from operations that the companies tra-
ditionally have used for capital investments prior to the change in the regula-
tion.'56 Over certain three-year periods, the four companies reported total net
152 TELECOMMUNICATIONS STOCKS, supra note 10, at 4.
153 U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
154 In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the Section 251 Unbun-
dling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R.
2533, 199 (Dec. 15, 2004).
155 Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks, supra note 3, at 494.
156 See id. Hazlett provides and example of this analysis:
Analysts further noted that decreasing investment was rational for RBOCs, and hence
positive for carrier shareholders. One "bright spot" identified by the investment com-
munity during the first quarter of 2003-the height of the UNE-P line growth boom-
was that "practically every teleco reported capex well below our expectations." One
firm noted that with SBC's capital expenditure to revenue ratio at 9%, there was little
room for further cuts, while Bell South and Qwest "still have some room to cut" at 11-
12% respectively, and Verizon at 15% "is likely best positioned to cut."
Id. (quoting MERRILL LYNCH, ILEC SCORECARD 2 (May 15, 2003)). Corporations use cash
earned from operations for one of two main purposes: (a) to finance new investment in plant
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cash flows from operating activities of $126 billion.'57 During the same peri-
ods, they paid dividends totaling $29 billion and invested $114 billion in new
capital.'58 If the net present value of their future cash flow was reduced by $19
billion, as our results suggest, it is reasonable to estimate that the net present
value of their future capital expenditures (absent the subsequent repeal of the
rule) would have declined by as much as 85% of this amount, or $16 billion. 5 9
Of course, corporations may also finance capital expenditures through debt,
or by reducing the amount of earnings paid out in dividends. Faced with a prof-
itable investment opportunity, a profit-maximizing firm often does both. The
FCC majority may have had this thought in mind when they eliminated broad-
band services from UNE regulation-thereby arguably creating an incentive
for the RBOCs to invest in new broadband facilities--even as it deprived them
of cash flow and incentives to invest in traditional facilities by leaving UNEs
in place on switching and other key network elements. A Goldman Sachs re-
port issued the day after the decision examined this theory, and found it unper-
suasive:
The FCC majority's stated goal in the Broadband ruling was to try to incent upgraded
investment from the RBOCs, with the logic that the Bells will simply upgrade faster
and more broadly in order to maximize the number of DSL lines that are not subject to
unbundling. We don't believe that this will have the intended effect .... We think
that it is naive to think that the Bells, facing such a negative UNE-P decision, will turn
around and step up spending on a part of their business that only produces long-run
incremental returns. In the short term, they need to respond to the damage that the
FCC has imposed on their existing business.' 6°
Industry analysts echoed the Goldman Sachs report. For example, Fitch Rat-
and equipment; or (b) to make payments to shareholders in the form of dividends. See JEF-
FREY D. BAUMAN, ALAN R. PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY
245 (6th ed. 2007). Shareholders benefit in either case, directly if the earnings are paid out
as dividends, and indirectly, by virtue of the increased value of the company's assets, if they
are retained. See id. The other significant source (and use) of cash is financial investments.
See id.
157 See BellSouth Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 54 (Feb. 28, 2003); Qwest
Communications Int'l Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 56 (Apr. 1, 2002); SBC Com-
munications Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 14, 2003), at 179; Verizon Communi-
cation Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 14, 2003). Data is from 2000-2002 for Bell-
South, SBC and Verizon, and for 1999-2001 for Qwest.
158 See BellSouth Corp., supra note 157, at 50-51; Qwest Communications Int'l Inc.,
supra note 157, at 85; SBC Communications Inc., supra note 157, exhibit 13; Verizon Com-
munications Inc., supra note 157, at 64-65.
159 This estimate is broadly consistent with previous estimates, calculated by very differ-
ent methodologies, of the impact of UNE-P on telecom capital expenditures. See supra,
notes 129-31 and accompanying text. If anything, the effect may be larger, as the continua-
tion of the UNE rules may cause companies to decrease capital expenditures as a proportion
of their operating earnings.
160 FRANK J. GOVERNALI ET AL., TELECOM SERVICES: FCC DECISION PROVIDES BRIGHTER
OUTLOOK FOR T, DIMMER FOR BELLS, GOLDMAN SACHS (2003).
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ings concluded that "[t]he relief from unbundling on broadband facilities pro-
vides some incentive to invest . . . , but the continuation of UNE-P in the resi-
dential market will impede the cash flow growth that the carriers, could in turn,
reinvest in broadband facilities."'' Similarly, Anna-Marie Kovacs, a respected
telecommunication analyst from Commerce Capital Markets, wrote that "the
rules make investment in fiber closer to the home much more appealing that it
has been, but they do not make cash available for investment ... the funds for
broadband are not likely to become available quickly."'62 Ultimately, the
Commission's action revoking the UNE-P regime hedged these negative ef-
fects; however, there is no reason that network operators will respond differ-
ently with respect to network investments subsequent to future network sharing
rules.
Some argue that to prevent discriminatory behavior by network operators,
rules need to be adopted that would force broadband network providers to al-
low access to firms offering competing services.'63 As noted above, substantial
evidence shows that network sharing reduces incentives to invest in new facili-
ties, since the discounted cash flow from such investments cannot be expected
to cover the costs of the investment. 6 Economic theory predicts, and the evi-
dence suggests, that this effect reduces capital investment by all market par-
ticipants.'65
By reducing the network owners' expected future cash flows, the FCC deci-
sion deprived them of internal sources of funds for new investment, 6" and a
similar decision would likely have the same effect. Our $19.2 billion estimate
of the drop in market capitalization can be interpreted as an estimate of the
discounted present value of the expected reduction in future cash flows. As a
consequence, all other things equal, capital expenditures by the firms would
161 Fitch Comments on the New FCC Rules Regarding Unbundling, FITCH RATINGS, Feb.
21, 2003.
162 ANNA-MARIE KOVACS ET AL., TELECOM REGULATION NOTE: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON
THE FCC's TRIENNIAL REVIEW, COMMERCE CAPITAL MARKETS (2003).
163 See, e.g., ANGELE A. GILROY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NET NEUTRALITY: BACK-
GROUND AND ISSUES 4 (2007); Davina Saskin, Failure of Imagination: Why Inaction on Net
Neutrality Regulation Will Result in a De Facto Legal Regime Promoting Discrimination
and Consumer Harm, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 261, 284, 300-09 (2006); Jerry Brito &
Jerry Ellig, A Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality and Regulatory Analysis, 16
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1,47-50 (2007).
164 Robert W. Crandall, The Remedy for the "Bottleneck Monopoly" in Telecom: Isolate
It, or Ignore It?, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 19-22 (2005); see supra notes 24-25 and accompany-
ing text.
165 Crandall, supra note 164, at 20-21 ("Mandating network sharing.., invites disputes
over network design and is likely to undercompensate network owners for the risk of the
premature obsolescence of their sunk facilities. Both of these problems are likely to reduce
capital spending and the development of new technologies ... .
166 Id at 19-21
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decline relative to what they would have been had the FCC acted according to
expectations. Similarly, announcement of a Commission rule against perceived
discriminatory behavior by broadband network owners will cause a significant
reduction in capital investment by the network owners, ultimately threatening
infrastructure and technology deployment.'67
VIII. CONCLUSION
The FCC's UNE regime was intended to increase competition in the market
for local wireline telephone services. Rather than focusing on facilities-based
entry, however, the UNE rules sought to make it profitable for new entrants to
resell the services of incumbents.
Net neutrality regulation, though perhaps motivated by non-economic
goals-such as First Amendment concerns-ultimately would affect invest-
ment incentives in much the same way as UNE-P: Like the UNE-P rules con-
sidered here, they would prevent network owners from capturing the full re-
turns on their investments. This study provides a stark reminder to policymak-
ers of the potential harms caused by forced sharing of network facilities, sug-
gesting that whatever concerns policymakers may have about net neutrality
should be addressed, if at all, through a more targeted approach.
APPENDIX A: THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Event Studies In Finance
An event study is an empirical investigation into the impact of a particular
type of event on a publicly traded firm. The underlying hypothesis is that the
event affects the firm's market value because it affects the future profitability
and the residual value of the firm. The event may be within the firm's control,
such as an earnings announcement, or outside the firm's control, such as a leg-
islative act being passed or a regulatory ruling being announced.
The impact of the event on a firm's stock price, or market value, reveals the
effects of the event on the firm's going forward value (i.e. the discounted pre-
167 See, e.g., John Eggerton, Analyst: Downturn Could Work Against Net Neutrality Leg-
islation, BROAD. & CABLE, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/
CA6604885.html?rssid= 193 Eggerton uses the cable industry as an example:
[The] economic argument cable has made all along ... [is] that network neutrality leg-
islation, or even the threat of it, can discourage the kind of investment in infrastructure
necessary to roll out broadband to underserved communities and expand the pipes for
all those band-width heavy applications, like video, that are becoming the currency of
online entertainment and community (YouTube, Hulu).
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sent value of its earnings), if the following four conditions are present: (1) the
event is a well-defined news item; (2) the time that the news reaches the mar-
ket is known; (3) there is no reason to believe that the market anticipated the
news; and, (4) it is possible to isolate the effect of the news from market, in-
dustry, and other specific factors simultaneously affecting the firm's stock
price.
A properly executed event study consists of the following three steps:
1. A statistical model is used to predict a stock's return (percentage change in
price) for a period beginning the day before news of the event reaches the
market to the day the news is assimilated into the stock price. The model
predicts stock returns based on market and industry events, but not the event
being investigated. As such, the model provides a benchmark stock return
against which actual returns can be measured.
2. Predicted returns are subtracted from actual returns to calculate what are
known as abnormal returns ("ARs"). ARs for short periods (usually individ-
ual trading days) typically are summed to give cumulative abnormal returns
("CARs") for a longer period. Because a statistical model is used to generate
predicted returns, they typically do not match actual returns, even when
there is no event, due to random statistical errors. Measures of statistical
significance have to be used to determine whether any differences between
predicted and actual returns are due to random chance or an event not cap-
tured by the model. That is, ARs have to be statistically significant in order
for one to conclude they are a result of the event being investigated.
3. Lastly, the magnitude of the event's impact is evaluated. Of the three gener-
ally accepted methods for doing so (the market model, the factor model, and
the dummy variable model), we chose the dummy variable model.'68
Generalized Model
The model used is a modified version of the dummy variable event study
model.'69 This model provides equivalent, and more convenient, results com-
168 For a detailed summary of different models used in event study analysis, see JOHN Y.
CAMPBELL, W. Lo ANDREW & A. CRAIG MACKrNLAY, THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS 149-80 (1997) and John J. Binder, The Event Study Methodology Since 1969, 11
REv. OF QUANT. FIN. & ACCT. 111-37 (1998).
169 Sankarshan Acharya, Value of Latent Information: Alternative Event Study Methods,
48 J. FIN. 363-85 (1993); John J. Binder, On the Use of Multivariate Regression Model in
Event Studies, J. ACCT. REs. 370-83 (1985); B. Espen Eckbo, Valuation Effects of Green-
mail Prohibitions, 25 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 491-505 (1990); Imre Karafiath, Using
Dummy Variables in the Event Methodology, 23 FIN. REv. 351-58 (1998); Paul H. Malatesta
& Rex Thompson, Partially Anticipated Events: A Model of Stock Price Reactions with an
Application to Corporate Acquisitions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 237-50 (1985); Katherine Schipper
& Rex Thompson, Evidence on the Capitalized Value of Merger Activity for Acquiring
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pared to other types of event models because it provides both "prediction er-
rors and correct test statistics in one step," using any statistical package. 7 ' The
model is as follows:
~2
rj, = a + fji7, + d , +
Where j, is the continuously compounded return to securityj over day t; m,
is the continuously compounded return to the value weighted market portfolio
over day t; d,, is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if t is day -1,
0 or 1 relative to event in question.
E., is assumed to be a mean zero, normally distributed error term that is in-
dependent to both ;?., and a,. The AR parameter gamma indirectly isolates the
component of the security's daily return that is due to the event itself. The
CAR is measured as the cumulative sum of the gamma coefficients.
Statistical significance for the one-day event is measured by the t-statistics
on the y coefficients. The significance of CARs is measured by a test of sig-
nificance of cumulative sum of the y's. The F-statistic for the CARs is deter-
mined by using a Wald Test (restricted least squares). 7 '
Data
The data used to estimate the stock-return model for the event study are
daily closing prices for publicly traded firms in the telecommunications indus-
try and the S&P 500 market index. To be included in the sample, each firm
needed to have daily stock prices for the entire estimation period. The firms are
organized into two portfolios: RBOCs (BellSouth, Qwest Communications,
SBC Communications and Verizon Communications) and UNE-P CLECs
(AT&T, Talk America, and Z-Tel).
The process of choosing firms for the sample was relatively straightforward.
The four RBOCs are the firms most directly affected by the UNE rules, as they
are required in all instances to make their lines available. While other ILECs
may also be required to resell their lines, many operate in rural areas where
there has been little competition for access, and many of the ILECs also oper-
ate outside their traditional service areas as CLECs.
The choice of the UNE-P CLEC portfolio required us to make several dis-
tinctions. First, we omitted Covad (a prominent CLEC) from the portfolio on
Firms, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 85-119 (1983); Robert Stillman, Examining Antitrust Policy To-
wards Horizontal Mergers, II J. FN. ECON., 225-40 (1983).
170 Karafiath, supra note 169, at 351.
'71 See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIc ECONOMETRIcs 257-58 (3d ed., 1995). The null
hypothesis of the test is that the abnormal return equals zero.
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the grounds that, uniquely among the CLECs, it relies on "line sharing," a form
of mandated access the FCC eliminated as part of its February 20, 2003 deci-
sion. Covad's stock fell precipitously as a result, and there is virtually no dis-
agreement that the drop was the result of the FCC action. Next, we distin-
guished between UNE-P CLECs (i.e., Z-Tel and Talk America, which rely
primarily on resale, and have not invested significantly in facilities) and other
CLECs on the grounds that the impact of the FCC action on CLECs that have
invested significantly in their own facilities is ambiguous: while they may be
helped by availability of UNEs in some instances, the value of their equipment
is reduced by the below-cost leasing of the same equipment by the RBOCs
under the UNE rules. Third, we included AT&T among the UNE-P CLECs
because of the firm's heavy reliance on UNE-P to enter the local telephone
market for residential customers and small businesses. Finally, we excluded
WorldCom (which would otherwise have been included in the portfolio on the
same grounds as AT&T) because its stock was not trading on major exchanges
due to its Chapter 11 status during the relevant times.
Daily stock returns for each firm are measured as Ri = (In p, - In P-i),
where Ri, is firm i's return on day t and pt and p,-1 are the closing prices on day
t and t-1. Portfolio returns are calculated by averaging stock returns across all
firms in the portfolio.
Empirical Model
To estimate the ARs and CARs, and their significance around the January
301h, February 11 h, and February 19th event dates, we use the following equa-
tion:
Rp = al + j31RM+ p1JAN29 + p2JAN30 + p3 JAN31 + y 1FEBIO + y2FEBll + Y3FEB12
+ XIFEB18 + 22FEB19 + X3FEB20 +e
Where Rp is the average daily return on a the portfolio, RM is the daily re-
turn on a the market index (the S&P 500), JAN29, JAN30, JAN31, FEB10,
FEB11, FEB12, FEB18, FEB19, and FEB20 are dummy variables that equal 1
on each respective date (year 2003), s is the econometric disturbance term, and
the p, y and ? are the estimated coefficients of an ordinary least squares regres-
sion." Variables JAN31, FEB12, and FEB20 measure the actual event date,
whereas the other dates are either minus-one or two trading days from the ac-
tual event. Lagged values of the event date (JAN29, JAN30, FEB10, FEB11,
FEB18 and FEB19) detect anticipation and information leaks.
172 This approach is similar to the models estimated in GEORGE BITrLINGMAYER & THO-
MAS W. HAZLETT, FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF BROADBAND REGULATION 18 (Oct. 25, 2001);
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STOCKS, supra note 10, at 6; John J. Binder, Measuring the Effects of
Regulation with Stock Price Data, 16 RAND J. ECON. 167, 171-72 (1985).
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Abnormal returns for the event are measured as both one-day or three-day
returns.' One-day abnormal returns are measured by the coefficients PIyI, .,
P2, Y2, X2 , P3, Y3, and X3. Three-day CARs are measured as the cumulative sum of
the coefficients pi, yi and ki.74 Statistical significance for the one-day event is
measured by the t-statistics on the coefficients Pi, Y1, XI, P2, 72, X2, P3, Y3, and X3,
while the three-day returns are measured by a test of significance of the cumu-
lative sum of the p's, y's and X's. Statistical significance of the CARs is deter-
mined by the Wald test, which provides an F-statistic.
13 See TELECOMMUNICATIONS STOCKS, supra note 10, at 6; see also Bittlingmayer &
Hazlett, supra note 172, at 18 (an example of abnormal returns for the event being measured
as a three-day return).
174 The cumulative return is measured as (I + P) (1 + p2) (1 + p3) - 1, and likewise for
the y's and X's.
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